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A SURVEY OF EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT LAW IN FLORIDA:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE APPLICATIONS OF EMPLOYMENT
CONTRACTS TO THE INTERESTS OF EMPLOYERS AND
EMPLOYEES
RONALD E. JOLLES*
Let me suggest that management-labor relations no longer thrive in a
social jungle where the big fish eat the little fish and the devil takes
the hindmost.'
Plaintiff claims that throughout the course of her employment she
was subjected to unsolicited sexual invitations from her male
supervisor, defendant Jones, the store manager.... Jones finally
discharged her because she refused to submit to his sexual advances
.... [P]laintiff's employment was terminable at-will, and ... [t]he
Complaint does not allege any conduct by defendants which would
support a pendent common law claim other than insulting
behavior .... 2
I. INTRODUCTION
N Florida, the simple creation of a valid employment contract of a
definite duration gives employees rights associated with the com-
mon law doctrine of wrongful discharge. In the absence of a contract,
however, an employee is subject to the common law doctrine of at-
will employment. This latter doctrine gives the employer unfettered
control over the terms and conditions of employment and termina-
tion.3 Employees, on the other hand, merely enjoy the right to quit
* Dedicated to Albert Epstein and to the memory of Leona Epstein. Thanks to Professor
William F. McHugh for his inspiration.
I. Russell & Axon v. Handshoe, 176 So. 2d 909, 917 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965) (Sturgis, C.J.,
dissenting).
2. Forde v. Royal's, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 1173, 1174-76 (S.D. Fla. 1982).
3. ARTmm L. CoRaN, CoRBIN ON CONMACTS § 647 (1963) (at-will employment means the
unconditional power to terminate the employment relationship); Note, Protecting At Will Em-
ployees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only In Good Faith, 93 HAxv. L.
REv. 1816 (1980) [hereinafter Protecting At Will Employees], cited with approval in Caster v.
Hennessey, 727 F.2d 1075, 1077 (lth Cir. 1984); LaRocca v. Xerox Corp., 587 F. Supp. 1002,
1003 (S.D. Fla. 1984); Muller v. Stromberg Carlson Corp., 427 So. 2d 266, 270 (Fla. 2d DCA
1983); Crawford v. David Shapiro & Co., 490 So. 2d 993, 996 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986).
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when they choose. 4 Therefore, from the employer's point of view,
such a contract should be seen as a Trojan Horse concealing common
law rights not available to Florida employees employed at-will., From
the employee's point of view, such a contract goes a long way toward
providing protection from employer excesses and abuses, 6 and may
create a limited property right. 7 However, such contracts are notori-
ously difficult to enforce in Florida because courts generally strictly
construe contract language denoting specific terms of employment.,
This Comment endeavors to compile the seminal cases and law re-
view articles comprising and accessing Florida's employment contract
law. Cases are grouped according to the interests of employers and
employees, and arranged in a checklist fashion, delineating the re-
quired and optional provisions of valid contracts. This Comment
summarizes common law at-will employment doctrine and provides a
neutral applications-oriented view of Florida employment contract
law as it presently exists. This analysis demonstrates that employment
contracts tend to create liability for employers while protecting em-
ployees. Specifically, the Comment describes the requirements neces-
sary to form a valid employment contract, the judicial methods for
interpreting that contract, and the available remedies for its breach. It
also describes employment contracts in the context of fiduciary duties
and peripheral tort and statutory causes of action. This Comment
highlights the recent movement toward providing statutory exceptions
4. CORBIN, supra note 3, § 70 ("hiring at will" denotes a unilateral contract where the
employee does not promise to work for a definite time but instead renders a specified service
entitling that employee to a promised salary). Corbin states, "The employee is privileged to stop
work at any time; the employer is bound by his promise to pay for service rendered, but has the
power of revocation as to service not yet rendered." Id.
5. See, e.g., Olsen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 759 F. Supp. 782, 786 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (noting
that "[i]f the contract provides for a definite term of employment, termination in advance of
expiration of the term is allowable only for cause"); see also Donald W. Brodie, Individual
Contracts of Employment, 39 LAB. L.J. 585, 590 n.31 (1988).
6. See generally David S. Hames, The Current Status of the Doctrine of Employment-At-
Will, 39 LAB. L.J. 19 (1988).
7. See Kelly v. Gill, 544 So. 2d 1162, 1164 (Fla. 5th DCA) (noting that a statute can create
a property interest if it lists specific grounds for discharge and states an employee can only be
dismissed for "just cause"), rev. denied, 553 So. 2d 1165 (Fla. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1029
(1990). But see Stough v. Gallagher, 967 F.2d 1523, 1530 (lth Cir. 1992) ("Florida deputy
sheriffs have no property or liberty interests ... for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
8. See Olsen, 759 F. Supp. at 786 (stating that "an employer may terminate the employee
at will unless prohibited by contractual language," limiting construction to the terms of the
contract, and placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff "to prove that the contract is not one
terminable at will"); DeMarco v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 360 So. 2d 134, 136 (Fla. 3d DCA
1978), cert. denied, 367 So. 2d 1123 (Fla. 1979), aff'd, 384 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1980); infra part V.;
see also American Agronomics Corp. v. Ross, 309 So. 2d 582, 584 (Fla. 3d DCA) (testimony
permitted to establish contract terms), cert. denied, 321 So. 2d 558 (Fla. 1975).
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to Florida's strict at-will doctrine. 9 Finally, this Comment places Flor-
ida employment law causes of action in perspective with other states'
causes of action, and recommends legislative enactment of certain
causes of action adding to Florida's at-will employment doctrine.
II. A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE GENERAL RULES OF EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONSHIPS APPLICABLE TO CONTRACTS OF EMPLOYMENT
Historically, the common law regarding employment contracts in
Florida has been dominated by a static at-will philosophy. The at-will
employment relationship is based on a unilateral contract of employ-
ment,'0 while an employment contract of a definite duration is based
upon a bilateral contract. The employee's additional legal rights hinge
upon this distinction.
In Florida, the general rules illustrating an employee's hybrid con-
tractual/tort common law relationship1' to an employer within the
unilateral contract/at-will employment philosophy are: first, an em-
ployment contract of an indefinite duration is terminable at the will of
either party, without cause;' 2 second, without a statutory or contrac-
tual for-cause termination requirement, the employee has no cause of
action in tort for wrongful discharge; 3 third, because no cause of ac-
tion in tort for wrongful discharge exists, the employee is similarly left
without a cause of action for negligent, malicious, or retaliatory dis-
charge;'4 and fourth, without a cause of action in tort for wrongful or
retaliatory discharge, Florida employers are relieved of any obligation
of good faith and fair dealing. 5
9. See FLA. STAT. § 440.205 (1979), construed in Smith v. Piezo Tech. & Prof. Adm'rs,
427 So. 2d 182, 183 (Fla. 1983) (holding that section 440.205 creates a cause of action for wrong-
ful discharge when an employee is fired for bringing a worker's compensation claim).
10. See Hope v. National Airlines, Inc., 99 So. 2d 244, 246 (Fla. 3d DCA 1957) (citing I
CORBIN, supra note 3, § 152 (1950)).
11. See Kirksey v. Jernigan, 45 So. 2d 188, 189 (Fla. 1950) cited with approval in Henry
Morrison Flagler Museum v. Lee, 268 So. 2d 434, 436 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972); see generally J.P.
McGuire, Foley v. Interactive Data Corporation: The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing," 41 LAB. L.J. 108 (1990) (analyzing whether "special relationship" under California
law gave rise to employer's duty).
12. See Smith v. Piezo Tech. & Prof. Adm'rs, 427 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 1983); DeMarco v.
Publix Super Markets, Inc., 384 So. 2d 1253, 1254 (Fla. 1980); Wynne v. Ludman Corp., 79 So.
2d 690 (Fla. 1955); Knudsen v. Green, 156 So. 240 (Fla. 1934); Savannah, F.& W. Ry. v. Willett,
31 So. 246, 246-47 (Fla. 1901).
13. See Smith, 427 So. 2d at 184; DeMarco, 360 So. 2d at 136; see, e.g., FLA. STAT. §
112.532 (1991) (granting law enforcement officers protection for exercising certain rights).
14. See DeMarco, 360 So. 2d at 136.
15. See, e.g., Catania v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 381 So. 2d 265, 267 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
(refusing to allow a cause of action in tort arising out of an employment contract); Maguire v.
American Fain. Life Assurance Co., 442 So. 2d 321, 323 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (noting that no
action for breach of an employment contract can stand when there is no contract specifying a
definite term of employment).
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In contrast, an employment contract of a definite duration is based
upon a bilateral contract. This fundamental difference alters general
common law rules of at-will employment by changing the first com-
mon law general rule: it provides the employee with the right to be
terminated only for cause-breach of contract 6-and in good faith. 17
Therefore, as a party to an employment contract of a definite dura-
tion, the Florida employer becomes liable in tort for wrongful dis-
charge and acquires the common law obligation to deal fairly with
employees and in good faith.
Accordingly, Florida employment contract law places heavy empha-
sis on the distinction between contracts of definite and indefinite du-
rations."5 For an employment contract to be judicially enforced, the
Florida employee must prove that such a bilateral contract is of a defi-
nite duration 9 and supported by valid consideration on the employ-
ee's behalf. For employees, proving the existence of valid
consideration is difficult because it appears that Florida courts do not
recognize continued work by the employee as an employee's valid con-
sideration supporting an employment contract.2 0 However, Florida
does recognize as consideration on the employer's behalf, the act of
an employer permitting employees to continue employment.2
Florida courts reluctantly, yet steadfastly, have deferred to the leg-
islature by their refusal to judicially expand employee cuases of ac-
16. Bacon v. Karr, 139 So. 2d 166, 170 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962) (citing 56 C.J.S. Master and
Servant, § 77; 25 C.J.S. Damages §§ 5-6).
17. See, e.g., Hazen, 117 So. at 855 (noting that when a contract for a definite term con-
tains a provision that says the job must be performed to the employer's satisfaction, the em-
ployee may be terminated any time the employer becomes dissatisfied "though no real or
substantial grounds for dissatisfaction exists"); see also Haiman v. Gundersheimer, 177 So. 199,
199-200 (Fla. 1937). See infra part III.A. (comparing objective good faith discharge for general
dissatisfaction and good faith discharge for breach of contract).
18. See infra part IV.A.
19. See Smith v. Piezo Tech. & Prof. Adm'rs, 427 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 1983); DeMarco v.
Publix Super Markets, Inc., 384 So. 2d 1253, 1254 (Fla. 1980); Wynne v. Ludman Corp., 79 So.
2d 690 (Fla. 1955); Knudsen v. Green, 156 So. 240 (Fla. 1934); Savannah, F.& W. Ry. v. Willett,
31 So. 246, 246-47 (Fla. 1901).
20. See Russell & Axon v. Handshoe, 176 So. 2d 909, 915 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965), cert. de-
nied, 188 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 1966); see generally 3A Co"aN, supra note 3, § 684; Brodie, supra
note 5, at 596. But see Lackey v. Whitehall Corp., 704 F. Supp. 201, 206 (D. Kan. 1988) (em-
ployee continued working after, and in exchange for, the employer's promise of deferred com-
pensation). The Lackey court held, "fc]onsideration is sufficient 'if the promisee, in return for
the promise does anything legal which he is not bound to do."' (quoting Bayshore Royal Co. v.
Doran Jason Co., 480 So. 2d 651, 656 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)).
21. Tasty Box Lunch Co. v. Kennedy, 121 So. 2d 52, 54 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960) (noting that
continued employment and agreement to pay outstanding commissions provided consideration
for non-compete agreement).
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tion. In DeMarco v. Publix Super Markets, Inc.,22 an employee was
fired by Publix for not accepting a $200 settlement for his daughter's
permanent eye injuries caused by flying glass from an exploding con-
tainer in a Publix store. 23 The Florida Supreme Court, however, af-
firmed summary judgment denying the plaintiff/employee a common
law cause of action for retaliatory termination. 4 Justice Ben Overton
dissented, 25 and subsequently referred to DeMarco in his special con-
currence in Smith v. Piezo Technology & Professional Administra-
tors,26 which upheld the newly-created statutory cause of action for
retaliatory discharge against an employer who wrongfully fired an em-
ployee for filing a Worker's Compensation claim.27 In Smith, the first
Florida case construing this issue, Justice Overton stated:
In DeMarco, the majority of this Court denied the same cause of
action to an employee who sought compensation for his injured
child. There is neither a logical nor justifiable reason for this
inconsistency to remain in our law. If a common law tort for
retaliatory discharge were allowed, all persons terminated from an
employment at will for seeking compensation for injury, whether to
the employee personally or to a dependent of the employee, would be
protected and provided full access to the courts.2
Justice Overton's has not gotten his wish, and to this day Florida
keeps its finger firmly in the dike of actionable claims for wrongful
discharge, retaliatory discharge, and any employee action for breach
of contract if an employment contract is of indefinite duration.
III. CREATING AN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT OF A DEFINITE DURATION
In Florida, few reasons exist for employers to prepare employment
contracts. For example, Florida courts have protected employers by
not allowing a common law property interest to be created for at-will
employment. 29 Employers are insulated from employees' causes of ac-
22. 360 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), cert. denied 367 So. 2d 1123 (Fla. 1979), aff'd, 384
So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1980).
23. Id. at 135.
24. DeMarco v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 384 So. 2d 1253, 1254 (Fla. 1980).
25. Id. at 1254 (Overton, J., dissenting).
26. Smith v. Piezo Tech. & Prof. Adm'rs, 427 So. 2d 182, 185 (Fla. 1983) (Overton, J.,
specially concurring).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See Kelly v. Gill, 544 So. 2d 1162, 1164 (Fla. 5th DCA) ("In the absence of a specific
statute granting a property interest, a contract of employment [lacking a set duration] is termina-
ble at the will of either party without cause .... "), rev. denied, 553 So. 2d 1165 (Fla. 1989),
cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1029 (1990). In addition, upon terminating an employee, a Florida em-
ployer may not have to pay any outstanding commissions. Cueto v. John Ailmand Boats, Inc.,
384 So. 2d 30, 31 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976).
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tion because employees have far fewer rights within the employment
relationship without a valid employment contract and its attendant
right to be discharged only for cause.30 By providing numerous justifi-
cations for employers to avoid creating employment contracts, the
current Florida laws addressing at-will employment encourage em-
ployers to remain in this dominant position.
Florida's at-will employment laws further favor employers by free-
ing them from nearly all liability for reneging on an employment offer
which the employee has already accepted. 3' If a signed employment
contract contains no starting date, and the place of employment closes
before the employee starts work, the employer is not contractually
bound if the trial court determines that the contract did not go into
effect .32 This is true regardless of whether the employee has quit a
prior position before accepting the position at issue.3 Damages may
be available for breach if the court determines that the contract is ac-
cepted and has been effectuated.14 The common-law justification is
that the law should function "to foster certainty in business relation-
ships."3"
Further, Florida does not recognize the common law tort of retalia-
tory discharge. 36 In Florida, an employer can terminate an employee,
without recourse, for refusing to perform an illegal act, 37 for filing
sexual harassment charges,3" and for not dismissing personal injury
30. Protecting At Will Employees, supra note 3, at 1816.
31. See Savannah, F. & W. Ry. v. Willett, 31 So. 246, 247 (Fla. 1901); Roy Jorgensen
Assocs. v. Deschenes, 409 So. 2d 1188, 1190 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Crawford v. David Shapiro &
Co., 490 So. 2d 993, 995 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) ("The mere fact that the rate of pay was expressed
in terms of an annual salary does not mean ... that the duration of employment is to be con-
strued to be one year.").
32. See, e.g., Quigley v. Laventhol & Howarth, 382 So. 2d 137, 138 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)
(noting that when there is no provision for a definite term of employment, "either party may
terminate at any time").
33. fd.
34. See Knudsen v. Green, 156 So. 240, 243 (Fla. 1934).
35. Muller v. Stromberg Carlson Corp., 427 So. 2d 266, 270 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).
36. See Smith v. Piezo Tech. & Prof. Adm'rs, 427 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 1983); Segal v. Arrow
Indus. Corp., 364 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Hartley v. Ocean Reef Club, Inc., 476 So. 2d
1327, 1328 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); OCHAB v. Morrison, Inc., 517 So. 2d 763, 764 (Fla. 2d DCA
1987); Jarvinen v. HCA Allied Clinical Lab., Inc., 552 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989); see infra
part VII.A.2.
37. See, e.g., Hartley, 476 So. 2d at 1328 (employee refused to violate environmental regu-
lations); OCHAB, 517 So. 2d at 764 (employee refused to serve alcohol to intoxicated individual
when serving alcohol in such a situation was a crime); Jarvinen, 552 So. 2d at 241 (employee
refused employer's request to commit perjury).
38. See Forde v. Royal's, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 1173, 1176-78 (S.D. Fla. 1982); Gmuer v.
Garner, 426 So. 2d 972, 974 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982).
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lawsuits brought by employees on behalf of their children. 9 In states
which recognize the tort of wrongful discharge, such terminations
would create causes of action.40 There are statutes, however, that pro-
vide certain exceptions to Florida's failure to recognize a common law
cause of action for retaliatory discharge 4' but they are very limited in
number. For example, an employer cannot discharge an employee for
filing a workers compensation claim, 42 or for fulfilling state jury
duty. 43
Moreover, Florida courts display no compulsion to create a com-
mon law cause of action based on a violation of the Florida constitu-
tional guarantees of access to the courts. 44 And, the Florida Supreme
Court distinctly has held that the lack of a common law action for
wrongful firing does not interfere with the individual rights guaran-
teed under Article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution. 45
A. Employer Disincentives
Typically, the employer prepares the employment contract, 4 and
thus must cover the legal fees and costs associated with its prepara-
tion. Basically, such costs, plus the added liabilities created by the
39. See DeMarco v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 360 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), cert.
denied, 367 So. 2d 1123 (Fla. 1979), aff'd 384 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1980).
40. See generally Catania v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 381 So. 2d 265, 267 (Fla. 3d DCA
1980) (listing other states that have common law causes of action for wrongful discharge); Ma-
guire v. American Fain. Life Assurance Co., 442 So. 2d 321, 323 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (listing
other states that "have read a 'good faith' requirement into the termination at will doctrine or
have recognized broad categories of exceptions to the doctrine itself").
41. See infra VII.B.; see also Hartley, 476 So. 2d at 1327 n.l.
42. FLA. STAT. § 440.205 (1979), construed in Smith v. Piezo Tech. & Prof. Adm'rs, 427
So. 2d 182, 183 (Fla. 1983).
43. FLA. STAT. § 40.271 (1991). construed in Pier 66 Co. v. Poulos, 542 So. 2d 377, 381
(Fla. 4th DCA), reh'g. denied, 551 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 1989).
Florida allows an employer to discharge an employee for fulfilling federal jury duty. See Hill
v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 699 F. Supp 876, 877 (M.D. Fla. 1988), aff'd and rev'd in part on
other grounds, 934 F.2d 1518 (lth Cir. 1991); accord Scott v. Estalella, 563 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1990). However, 28 U.S.C. § 1875 prohibits employers from firing employees for jury
service in a United States court.
44. DeMarco v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 384 So. 2d 1253, 1254 (Fla. 1980) (see also
Overton, J. dissenting); DeMarco v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 360 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 3d DCA
1978), a/I'd, 384 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1980) (construing FLA. CONST. art. I, §§ 9, 21 (1968)).
45. DeMarco, 384 So. 2d at 1254.
46. For a sample employment agreement, see CHARLES G. BAKALY JR. & JOEL M. GRoss-
MAN, Tr MODEr. LAW OF EmpLoymENr RELATIONSHXPS App. C, at 399 (2d ed. Supp. 1992).
This source is indicative of other sources which only illustrate examples of contracts prepared by
the employer.
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preparation of employment contracts, may outweigh the benefits to
the employer. Fiduciary duties imparted at common law, however, en-
courage employers to simply avoid all of the specifics of good faith
requirements by avoiding employment contracts of definite duration.
Thus, such fiduciary duties make it redundant for employers to im-
part them contractually.
In addition to the difficulties and expense of constructing a valid
employment contract of a definite duration, such contracts create
causes of action for the employee for wrongful discharge. 4 For exam-
ple, terminating a valid employment contract necessitates that it be
done with a reasonable basis, 4 or in good faith; but without such a
contract, there is no remedy for bad faith termination.4 9 Florida rec-
ognizes two variations on "good faith" discharge: (1) good faith dis-
charge based on an employer's general dissatisfaction; and (2) good
faith discharge based on an employee's breach of contract. For exam-
ple, when a valid contract is created, it imparts a duty on the em-
ployer to terminate in good faith for the reasons expressed in the
contract.5 0 If the contract specifies the employee is to provide services
to the employer's satisfaction, the employer may terminate the em-
ployee any time he is dissatisfied with the employee, provided the dis-
satisfaction is in good faith."
Lastly, Florida recognizes many fiduciary duties imparted on em-
ployees at common law. 2 For example, employees may not commit
any type of disloyal acts in anticipation of future competition,5 3 such
as using trade secrets learned while working for an employer.14 Also,
employees who may be planning to leave and start their own busi-
nesses may not discuss future employment with other employees while
still in the service of the employer." Because these duties are already
47. See Haiman v. Gundersheimer, 177 So. 199, 199-200 (Fla. 1937); Placet, Inc. v. Ash-
ton, 368 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 3d DCA) (utilizing contract language for the proposition that employee
can be terminated only if employee breaches contract), cert. denied sub nora. Esser v. Ashton,
378 So. 2d 343 (Fla.), cert. denied, 378 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 1979). Note that by employing at-will
employees, an employer can avoid liability for terminating an employee in bad faith. Hartley v.
Ocean Reef Club, Inc., 476 So. 2d 1327, 1328 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985).
48. Hazen v. Cobb, 117 So. 853, 855-56 (Fla. 1928).
49. Hartley, 476 So. 2d at 1328.
50. See Placet, Inc., 368 So. 2d at 409 (citing Haiman, 177 So. 2d at 201) (holding that the
employee could be terminated only if the employee breaches).
51. Hazen, 117 So. at 856; Paddock v. Bay Concrete Indus., 154 So. 2d 313, 315 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1963).
52. See infra part VI.A.
53. See Insurance Field Servs. v. White & White Inspection & Audit Serv., 384 So. 2d 303,
308 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
54. See Unistar Corp. v. Child, 415 So. 2d 733, 735 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
55. See Fish v. Adams, 401 So. 2d 843, 845 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Security Title & Abstract,
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imparted on employees at common law, the need to impart them on
employees contractually is alleviated.
B. Employer Incentives56
While employment contracts may create disadvantages for employ-
ers, several reasons exist which may encourage employers to choose to
draft such documents. Even with a valid employment contract, the
employer may still discharge an employee under Florida courts' broad
interpretation of "just cause," provided the termination is not for un-
reasonable, arbitrary, capricious, or bad faith reasons. 7 For example,
one court held the "for cause" requirement was satisfied when the
"cause" had nothing to do with the employee's performance or con-
duct.58 An employer voluntarily closing the portion of his business
where the employee worked can constitute "just cause" for termina-
tion purposes.9
The foregoing discussion illustrates the tendency of Florida courts
to interpret employment termination clauses as at-will employment re-
lationships, even when they are part of a valid employment contract. 0
While a court may uphold the provisions in the rest of the contract,
employers may still avoid these obligations simply by terminating the
employee. As these cases usually arise when employees sue employers
for breach of contract, the results are rulings usually favorable to em-
ployers. 6' Generally, courts hold that the plaintiff/employee failed to
state a cause of action.62
Inc. v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 414 So. 2d 604, 605 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Puga v. Suave Shoe
Corp., 427 So. 2d 288, 289 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). See generally Sloan v. Sax, 505 So. 2d 526, 528
(Fla. 3d DCA 1987).
56. A discussion of other popular and employee-satisfaction related reasons for employ-
ment contracts is beyond the scope of this Comment. See generally Bahman Bahrami, Produc-
tivity Improvement Through Cooperation of Employees and Employers, 39 LAD. L.J. 167 (1988)
(containing a detailed discussion of how providing employment contracts may lead to greater
employee satisfaction).
57. See Telesphere Int'l, Inc. v. Scollin, 489 So. 2d 1152, 1155 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied,
500 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 1986) (holding that "Telesphere had the absolute right to terminate Scollin
under the terms of the agreement but may have been guilty of fraudulently inducing him to enter
into it").
58. Id. at 1153.
59. See id.
60. Employment termination clauses denote a contractual requirement that the employer
state reasons for termination; such a requirement denotes the definitive for cause employment
relationship.
61. See, e.g., Hope v. National Airlines, 99 So. 2d 244, 245 (Fla. 3d DCA 1957) (holding
invalid an oral contract for permanent employment).
62. Id. But see IA CORBIN, supra note 3, § 152 n. 11.20.
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1. Noncompete Agreements63
Employers may wish to create a valid employment contract to in-
corporate noncompete agreements, in order to protect their legitimate
business interests." For instance, by binding an employee to a non-
compete agreement, the employer can protect interests such as "trade
secrets, customer lists, and the right to prevent direct solicitation of
existing customers." 65 Additionally, employers who have paid to in-
crease and develop the skills of their employees through additional job
training or education are somewhat protected from their employees
using the acquired skills to compete against them in the same mar-
ket. 66
In an attempt to protect the employer's property interest in its hu-
man investment while allowing marketplace competition for valued
employees, the Florida legislature has enacted laws regulating the
amount of control employers have over their employees after they
have stopped paying them.67 While section 542.33, Florida Statutes,
permits noncompete agreements that afford the employer protection
from unfair competition by the employee," it declares invalid any em-
ployment contract that simply prohibits the employee from competing
with the employer. 9 Further, noncompete agreements within employ-
ment contracts have been invalidated when employers breach by arbi-
trarily reducing the employee's contracted-for salary, 70 and when
employers restrain employees' marketing and use of their "unprotecti-
ble" skills which they did not acquire at the employer's expense.*'
Primarily, section 542.33 attempts to balance employers' desires to
maintain dominion over valuable employees against the need of soci-
ety, and of the marketplace, for unfettered trade in personal skills.72
63. The rules of noncompete agreements have changed dramatically within the past four
years. Although a comprehensive summary of these changes is outside the scope of this Article,
this part will touch upon some of the significant changes as they relate to employment contracts.
See generally FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.33 (West Supp. 1993) (providing a more comprehensive
review of the current state of Florida law regarding noncompete agreements); Hapney v. Central
Garage, Inc., 579 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 591 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1991); Kendall B.
Coffey & Thomas F. Nealon, III, Noncompete Agreements Under Florida Law: A Retrospective
and a Requiem?, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. Rv. 1105 (1992).
64. Hapney, 579 So. 2d at 134 (construing FLA. STAT. § 542.33 (West Supp. 1990).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.33 (1), (2)(a) (West Supp. 1993).
68. See Hapney, 579 So. 2d at 134. See Coffey & Nealon, supra note 63, at 1138.
69. Hapney, 579 So. 2d at 134.
70. See Troup v. Heacock, 367 So. 2d 691, 692 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979) (holding that reducing
the agreed-upon salary was breach of the employment contract).
71. Hapney, 579 So. 2d at 134.
72. SeeCoffey&Nealon, supranote63, at 1139.
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At the extremes, employers' desires to keep an employee whose skills
they have paid to increase, 73 as well as their desires to protect their
sales markets and territories from ambitious employees, are balanced
against laws prohibiting involuntary servitude and peonage. 4
Subsequent to the 1990 amendments to section 542.33, 7 courts have
further interpreted the section to apply retrospectively and to provide
the following: (1) covenants designed solely to prohibit the former em-
ployee from competing with the former employer are void; (2) the
covenant must protect an employer's legitimate business interest; (3)
covenants are applicable to agents, independent contractors, and em-
ployees; (4) the employer has the burden to plead and prove the pro-
tectible interests; (5) trade secrets, customer lists, and the right to
prevent direct solicitation of the employer's existing customers are per
se protectible interests; and (6) other business interests such as ex-
traordinary training or education may be protectible interests . 6
Although mutuality of obligation is a requirement for a valid em-
ployment contract, 7 in Wright & Seaton Inc. v. Prescott,78 the court
held that an employee whose employment contract did not contain
such mutuality, may still be bound by a noncompete clause provided
the agreement is supported by independent consideration.9 The
Wright court found that since the notice agreed to was written, it pro-
vided consideration, and thus alleviated the need for mutuality of ob-
ligation.80 Although providing notice is an employer's common law
obligation and thus a preexisting duty, the additional required act of
writing appeared to be the peppercorn providing consideration. While
the 1990 amendments to section 542.33 provide a more stringent stan-
dard for the creation of valid noncompete agreements, 8 they did not
73. See, e.g., Hapney, 579 So. 2d at 134.
74. See Troup, 367 So. 2d at 692; Hapney, 579 So. 2d at 129 (citing Standard Newspapers,
Inc. v. Woods, 110 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1959)); BAKAiY & GROSSMAN, supra note 46, at § 1.5, 13
(rev. 2d ed. Supp. 1992).
75. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.33 (West Supp. 1993).
76. Hapney, 579 So. 2d at 134 (construing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.33 (West Supp. 1993));
see also Coffey & Nealon, supra note 63, at 1133-40.
77. See discussion infra part IV.C.
78. 420 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).
79. Id. at 624 n.2; see also infra parts IV.B-C.
80. See Wright & Seaton, Inc. v. Prescott, 420 So. 2d 623, 627 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982) (hold-
ing that an employer's agreement to give an employee written notice of termination is sufficient
consideration for a noncompete clause); see also Tasty Box Lunch Co. v. Kennedy, 121 So. 2d
52, 54 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960) (holding that continued employment and the employer's agreement to
pay outstanding commissions provided consideration for the employee's agreement not to com-
pete).
81. See Coffey & Nealon, supra note 63, at 1133-40.
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specifically address the Wright court's cavalier treatment of mutuality
of obligation . 2
2. Binding Upper Level Management Through Complex Deferred
Compensation Agreements and Stock Option Plans
Employment contracts intending to create a consensual, long-term
employment relationship may include compensation agreements such
as the gradual vesting of profit-sharing or the offering of stock op-
tions through the sale of securities. While it is axiomatic that the pri-
mary reason for memorialization of a complex employee
compensation agreement is to avoid future disagreement over its
terms, section 678.319, Florida Statutes, codifying section 8-319 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, requires that the sale of securities be in
writing .83
Yearly offers of stock options do not necessarily form an employ-
ment contract, nor do they constitute offers to enter into unilateral
employment contracts 4 "[T]he mere existence of a stock option or
other inchoate employee benefit is insufficient, standing alone, to in-
dicate an agreement" upon anything more than an employment con-
tract that is terminable at-will. 85 In Florida, however, the offer of
stock options has given rise to a duty of good faith not to terminate
the employee for purposes of frustrating the employee's exercise of
the stock options.86
It is important to note that such agreements would be perfectly
valid and achieve their desired results if memorialized outside of an
employment contract of a definite duration. That an employment con-
tract containing a compensation agreement may be terminable at-will
does not automatically invalidate the compensation agreement. 87 Fur-
ther, the Third District Court of Appeal has held that a stock option
compensation agreement of a definite duration within a terminable-at-
will employment contract does not create an employment contract of
a definite duration. 88
An employer may unilaterally modify the terms of the compensa-
tion plan of an employment-at-will contract provided the employee
82. Id. at 1129 n. 148; see discussion infra IV.B-C.
83. See BAKALY & GROSSMAN, supra note 46, at § 5.1, 64.
84. See Harrison v. Jack Eckerd Corp., 342 F. Supp. 348, 350 (M.D. Fla.), aff'd, 468 F.2d
951 (5th Cir. 1972).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See Martin v. Golden Corral Corp., 601 So. 2d 1316, 1317 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).
88. See Hoffman v. Robinson, 213 So. 2d 267, 268 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968).
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receives notice of the change and the employee accepts the change.89
The burden of proof is on the party asserting the modification. 90
Therefore, although employers may unilaterally modify such plans,
modifications may be invalidated, even within at-will employment re-
lationships, if the employer cannot prove both notice and accep-
tance. 91
In sum, the reasons for constructing an employment agreement
should not be confused with the reasons for written memorialization
of the language of long-term compensation. From an employer's per-
spective, if an agreement is not needed then an agreement should not
be formed; if the employer requires no more than an incentive for the
employee to remain with the employer, then care should be taken not
to bind the employer to more responsibilities than necessary.
3. "Loser Pays" Clauses
An employer can use the employment contract to provide a disin-
centive for an employee to litigate non-substantive, employment-re-
lated claims by contractually binding the employee to a "loser pays"
provision. This type of provision requires the loser of post-employ-
ment contract litigation to pay the winner's legal fees and costs. These
provisions make both parties aware of the risks of an unsuccessful
lawsuit and thereby deter baseless or harassing claims. 92
Although the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure allow that, in gen-
eral, initiating frivolous claims can result in attorney's fees sanc-
tions,93 several justifications exist for including a "loser pays" clause
in an employment contract. First, employees are more likely to be
aware of express provisions in their own employment contracts than a
possible legal sanction derived from a rule of civil procedure, there-
fore a "loser pays" clause in the contract throughout preliminary ne-
gotiations and throughout the employment relationship could better
deter nonsubstantive claims. Secondly, it may be easier to recover fees
under a contractual "loser pays" clause than to recover fees as a sanc-
tion for a frivolous action. However, section 57.105(2), Florida Sta-
tutes, requires that if the "loser pays" provision attempts to bind the
89. Martin, 601 So. 2d at 1317.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See generally Swint v. Volusia County Dep't of Pub, Works, No. 83-226-ORL-CIV-18,
1984 WL 1098, at *6 (M.D. Fla. 1984) (holding that defendant employer was entitled to costs
and reasonable fees because the plaintiff's claim that he was discharged for racial reasons was
frivolous).
93. See FLA. STAT. § 57.105(1) (1991); accord Swint, 1984 WL 1098 at *6 (justifying award
of fees because plaintiff presented no evidence in support of claim).
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employee only, in lieu of the losing party, it will be the losing party
that will have to pay fees and costs, regardless of the contractual lan-
guage. 94
An employer who is able obtain a judgment for fees and costs pur-
suant to a "loser pays" clause is often subsequently faced with col-
lecting them from an unemployed debtor. Therefore, the primary
benefit of including a "loser pays" clause in an employment contract
is not the award of fees and costs, but the disincentive to litigate non-
substantive claims.
4. Creating Express Employee Liability
It is axiomatic that breach of an express contractual provision is a
breach of contract, providing just cause for termination of the con-
tract, and possibly the award of damages to the non-breaching party.
Whereas the issue of an employee's breach of express duty is more
amenable to summary judgment, the issue of an employee's breach of
implied or fiduciary duties may require a trial. Although determining
both types of duties are questions of law, determining whether an em-
ployee breaches a duty is a question of fact. 95 Punkar v. King Plastic
Corp.,91 however, modifies this principle by limiting the issue of fact
to the jury only "if the pertinent evidence on this issue could lead the
minds of reasonable men to conflicting conclusions. If not, the issue
becomes a question of law to be decided by the court."
The nature of an express duty is similar to that of an express act,
and an act is a more concrete concept than an implied fiduciary duty.
Accordingly, determining the breach of an express duty can be done
more easily by admitting uncontroverted evidence of the commission
or omission of an act. 97 For example, if an employment contract states
that an employee is "to make reports in the manner and form re-
quired by the employer,' ' or that "leaving rate information" with a
non-employee is grounds for discharge, 99 determining a breach of con-
tract is as easy as determining the commission of these acts. Yet, when
no duties are expressed, it is merely implied "that the employee will
faithfully perform the duties required . . . in the manner directed by
the employer, provided, of course, the employer may reasonably
94. SeeFLA. STAT. § 57.105(2) (1991).
95. See Haiman v. Gundersheimer, 177 So. 199, 200-01 (Fla. 1937); Punkar v. King Plastic
Corp., 290 So. 2d 505, 507 (Fla. 2d DCA) (quoting Jimarye, Inc. v. Pipkin, 181 So. 2d 669 (Fla.
Ist DCA 1966)), cert. denied, 297 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 1974).
96. 290 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert. denied, 297 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 1974).
97. See Haiman, 177 So. at 200-01.
98. Id.
99. Olsen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 759 F. Supp. 782, 785 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
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make such requirements." '0 This implied duty contains ambiguous
terms such as "faithfully," "manner," and "reasonably" which can
become arguable issues for a jury to determine, but which could be
avoided by creating express contractual duties.
The creation of express employee liability for violating express fidu-
ciary duties is another reason to form an employment contract. 10'
Where the type of duty allegedly breached is express rather than im-
plied, summary judgment for contract breach and injunctive relief
would be more quickly and easily obtained, thereby avoiding a trial.
Immediate injunctive relief may be necessary where a business is
failing as a result of an ex-employee's breach of a fiduciary or other
duty. 02 If the employee is critical to the employer, or handles sensitive
information or clients, it would be easier to enforce such duties, or be
compensated for their breach, if the employment contract specifically
addressed such duties. Finally, express duties and provisions, like an
express "loser pays" clause, provide more of a deterrent and are thus
less likely to be breached than implied common law duties unknown
to the employee.
5. Limiting the Employer's Liability for Employee Actions
Employers may be liable to third parties for their employees' inten-
tional voluntary torts and crimes. 0 3 Employer liability divides into
two causes of action: (1) liability for negligent hiring and retention,
and (2) liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior for commit-
ting acts that further the employer's interests.
a. Negligent Hiring and Retention
Negligent hiring occurs when employers breach their duty to "inde-
pendently investigate" an employee's background and fail to learn
100. Haiman, 177 So. at 201.
101. See Jon M. Gumbel & Jim Hoover, Employment Contracts: An Option To Consider,
41 LAB. L.J. 175, 177-78 (1990).
102. See Haiman v. Gundersheimer, 177 So. 199 (Fla. 1937); Fish v. Adams, 401 So. 2d 843
(Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Security Title & Abstract, Inc. v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 414 So. 2d 604
(Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Unistar Corp. v. Child, 415 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Puga v. Suave
Shoe Corp., 427 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Phillips Chem. Co. v. Morgan, 440 So. 2d 1292
(Fla. 3d DCA 1983), rev. denied, 450 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 1984); Sloan v. Sax, 505 So. 2d 526 (Fla.
3d DCA 1987); Templeton v. Creative Loafing Tampa, Inc., 552 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989);
In re Hallmark Builders, Inc., 57 B.R. 121 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1986).
103. See Island City Flying Serv. v. General Elec. Credit Corp., 585 So. 2d 274, 276 (Fla.
1991); Williams v. Feather Sound, Inc., 386 So. 2d 1238, 1239-40 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980), rev.
denied, 392 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1981); Gonpere Corp. v. Rebull, 440 So. 2d 1307, 1308 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1983); Abbott v. Payne, 457 So. 2d 1156, 1157 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984).
19931
182 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:167
pertinent information about the employee's past. 104 Such information
would have placed the employer on notice that the employee should
not have been allowed to have contact with customers or have been
allowed in their homes. 05 "Negligent retention . . .occurs when dur-
ing the course of employment, the employer becomes aware or should
have become aware of problems with an employee. . . indicat[ing un-
fitness for customer contact]" but "fails to take further action, such
as investigation, discharge, or reassignment."' 106 If a court determines
that an employer's negligent hiring or retention is the proximate cause
of an employee's tortious conduct, then the employer will be held lia-
ble for any proven damages. 07
Employers cannot contract away their liability for these torts. Em-
ployers remain obligated to take a written application, diligently in-
quire of the employee's references, and, depending on the nature of
the employee's tasks, make other appropriate inquiries.108
b. Respondeat Superior Liability for Acts Committed by Employees
While Furthering the Employer's Interests
If an employee breaks the law while furthering the employer's inter-
ests, the employer could be held liable. 109 For example, one jury deter-
mined that a building owner was liable for its apartment manager's
shooting of a tenant who failed to leave the premises after receiving
an eviction notice." 0 The jury found the apartment manager's action
to be in furtherance of the employer's interest."' Had the building
owner made an attempt to delineate in writing the expected reasonable
scope of the apartment manager's duties, the owner's liability for the
apartment manager's irrational conduct may have been alleviated
somewhat. The general rule states:
An employer is liable in damages for the wrongful act of his
employee that causes injury to another person, if the wrongful act is
104. See Tallahassee Furniture Co. v. Harrison, 583 So. 2d 744, 751-52 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991),
rev. denied, 595 So. 2d 558 (Fla. 1992) (citing Mallory v. O'Neil, 69 So. 2d 313, 315 (Fla. 1954));
Williams, 386 So. 2d at 1240; Abbott, 457 So. 2d at 1157.
105. See Williams, 386 So. 2d at 1240; Harrison, 583 So. 2d at 751-52.
106. Harrison, 583 So. 2d at 753 (citing Garcia v. Duffy, 492 So. 2d 435, 438 (Fla. 2d DCA
1986)).
107. See Williams, 386 So. 2d at 1239-40; Harrison, 583 So. 2d at 750-55.
108. See Harrison, 583 So. 2d at 751-52.
109. See Gonpere Corp. v. Rebull, 440 So. 2d 1307, 1308 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Garcy v.
Broward Process Servers, Inc., 583 So. 2d 714, 716-17 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (Glickstein, J.,
dissenting).
110. Gonpere Corp., 440 So. 2d at 1308.
111. Id.
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done while the employee is acting within the apparent scope of his
authority as such employee to serve the interests of the employer,
even though the wrongful act also constitutes a crime not a homicide
or was not authorized by, or was forbidden by, the employer, or was
not necessary or appropriate to serve the interests of the employer,
unless the wrongful act of the employee was done to accomplish his
own purposes, and not to serve the interests of the employer.11 2
Employment contracts could serve to alleviate employers' potential
liability for the intentional torts and crimes of their employees by
clearly defining the scope of employee duties, and by specifically iden-
tifying employer interests. The contract would thus serve as a tool for
the jury and the court to use in assessing whether the employee's ac-
tions were within the scope of employment.
6. Allowing for the Liquidation of Litigation-Related Claims
An employment contract could also alleviate the need for a trial to
determine damages by including a liquidated damages clause." 3 Such
clauses are also found within noncompete agreements where the em-
ployer tries to create a valid, easily enforceable remedy for when em-
ployees, such as certified public accountants, quit and take with them
their employer's clients. 114 This remedy is applicable in any situation
where employees can meet their employer's clients, subsequently form
their own businesses, and then attempt to solicit their employers' cli-
ents are their own.
7. Suspending the Onset of For-Cause Employment By Setting
Probationary and Temporary Employment Periods
Termination without cause during a probationary period has been
upheld as an exception to the termination for-cause requirement in-
herent in both employment contracts of a definite duration' 1 and
public service employment." 6 Designating a probationary employment
period allows the employer to terminate the employee at-will for a
specified duration prior to the onset of for-cause termination rights." 7
112. Id. (quoting Stinson v. Prevatt, 94 So. 656, 657 (Fla. 1922)).
113. For a more detailed discussion of liquidated damages clauses see infra part VIII.C.
114. Id.
115. See Critchlow v. WFC Mortgage Co., 315 So. 2d 483, 484 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975).
116. See Swint v. Volusia County Dep't of Pub. Works, No. 83-226-ORL-CIV-18, 1984 WL
1098 (M.D. Fla. 1984); Brodie, supra note 5, at 588.
117. See Palmer v. Dist. Bd. of Trustees, 748 F.2d 595, 601 (1 1th Cir. 1984); see generally
Vienneau v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 548 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989).
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Although employment manuals typically cover probationary and
temporary employment periods, addressing and setting these provi-
sions in a separate employment contract will temporarily suspend the
employee's termination for-cause rights without binding employers to
other terms included in the employment manual.II8
IV. THE STRUCTURE OF A VALID EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT
Essential characteristics of a valid employment contract in Florida
include: (1) a term of definite duration, and (2) consideration or mu-
tuality of obligation by both parties. Other provisions may be essen-
tial to the contracting parties, but their exclusion will neither render
the contract unenforceable nor preclude a cause of action for breach.
A. Duration
For an employee to be considered wrongfully discharged at law, the
employee must be employed for a definite term." 9 There is no cause
of action without a binding definite term of employment. 20 There-
fore, employment contracts of an indefinite duration are not enforce-
able in Florida.' 2' However, internal provisions, such as the promise
of a guaranteed bonus, have been held to be valid despite being part
of such a contract. 2 2
An employment contract containing a specified term of employ-
ment requires "definiteness and certainty in its terms,"' 2 -i.e., a def-
inite start date and a definite term of duration. 24 The court may look
anywhere within the contract to determine the existence of and to de-
118. See discussion infra part IV.E.3.
119. Haiman v. Gundersheimer, 177 So. 199, 199-200 (Fla. 1937) (fired employee sued em-
ployer for damages for wrongful firing; existence of a definite start date within the contract
created a valid employment contract of a definite duration and allowed termination for cause
only).
120. Maguire v. American Fain. Life Assurance Co., 442 So. 2d 321, 323 (Fla. 3d DCA
1983), rev. denied, 451 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 1984).
121. See DeMarco v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 384 So. 2d 1253, 1254 (Fla. 1980) (quoting
DeMarco v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 360 So. 2d 134, 136 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), cert. denied,
367 So. 2d 1123 (Fla. 1979), aff'd, 384 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1980)); Wynne v. Ludman Corp., 79
So. 2d 690, 691 (Fla. 1955); Knudsen v. Green, 156 So. 240, 242 (Fla. 1934); Savannah, F. & W.
Ry. v. Willett, 31 So. 246, 247 (Fla. 1901).
122. See De Felice v. Moss Mfg., 461 So. 2d 209, 210 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984).
123. Muller v. Stromberg Carlson Corp., 427 So. 2d 266, 268 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) (denying
that contract terms were vague enough for the jury to be permitted to draw inferences). But see
American Agronomics Corp. v. Ross, 309 So. 2d 582, 584 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975) (allowing the jury
to evaluate contradictory evidence of contract terms), cert. denied, 321 So. 2d 558 (Fla. 1975).
124. E.g., Hazen v. Cobb, 117 So. 853, 855 (Fla. 1928) (upholding contract of employment
"for one year from date"); Haiman v. Gundersheimer, 177 So. 199, 199-200 (Fla. 1937).
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fine definite start dates and terms of duration. 125 However, inconsis-
tencies regarding the term of appointment which create disputed
ambiguous inferences are to be resolved by the trier of fact.126
There are numerous Florida cases defining definite start dates and
terms of duration . 2  Courts have held that contractual language ex-
tending a work assignment for a definite period and beginning on a
specific date, had created a valid employment contract. 12 However,
125. See Paddock v. Bay Concrete Indus., 154 So. 2d 313, 315-16 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963).
126. See Kasweck v. Florida Inst. of Tech., 590 So. 2d 1100, 1102 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991).
127. See Hazen, 117 So. at 855 (upholding contract of employment "for one year from
date"); Haiman, 177 So. at 199-200 (existence of a definite start date within the contract created
a valid employment contract); Bacon v. Karr, 139 So. 2d 166, 168 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962) (existence
of a definite start date followed by a definite term of duration created valid employment con-
tract); Paddock, 154 So. 2d at 315 (the phrase, "[tihe terms [sic] of this contract shall be for 5
years from the date hereof, except as hereinafter provided," created a valid contract); Placet,
Inc. v. Ashton, 368 So. 2d 404, 406 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (contractual language which specified a
seven-year period with a start and finish date constituted a valid contract), cert. denied sub nom.
Esser v. Ashton, 378 So. 2d 343 (Fla.), cert. denied, 378 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 1979); Maines v. Davis,
491 So. 2d 1233, 1235 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (a written contract stating a one-year term of dura-
tion, providing for annual compensation, and resulting in work performed for two and one-half
months with wages being paid into the third month constituted a legally enforceable contract);
Grappone v. City of Miami Beach, 495 So. 2d 838, 839 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (contract with a
duration "commencing April 8, 1985, and ending upon the return of the regular secretary who
was on a six-month maternity leave" created a valid employment contract); Harris v. Cocoanut
Grove Dev. Co., 59 So. 11, 11-12 (Fla. 1912) (finding that a cause of action immediately arises
upon "breach of a contract of employment for one year .. "); Nunes v. Margate Gen. Hosp.,
Inc., 435 So. 2d 916, 917 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983) (evidence that during hiring employee expressed
"that his term of employment had to be definite; i.e., for the entire school year" and that
employee "would not be terminated during the school year unless he did 'something really disas-
trous' " was sufficient to send the case to the fact finder); Kasweck, 590 So. 2d at 1101-02
(letters stating that a professor's appointment was for the "academic year beginning September
14, 1987, and ending June 11, 1988" with a three-year term of appointment were sufficient to
prove the validity of the employment contract); Venus Lab., Inc. v. Katz, 601 So. 2d 630, 631
(Fla. 3d DCA) (enforcing new owner/employer's promise of employment to former owner "as a
consultant for $20,000 a year, plus expenses ... for so long as any portion of the obligations in
the larger agreement between the parties ... remained to be paid. ), rev. denied, 613 So.
2d 12 (Fla. 1992).
Compare Vienneau v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 548 So. 2d 856, 857-58 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)
(contract language stating "[tihis transfer will be temporary in nature for a thirty-six month
period commencing from the time of your visa approval," combined with employer's recogni-
tion of plaintiff as a "permanent employee" may constitute a valid employment contract) with
Roy Jorgensen Assocs. v. Deschenes, 409 So. 2d 1188, 1189 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982) (the language
"on or about October 31 you will be assigned to [a certain place] for a period of 28 months"
failed to state a definite duration).
See also American Agronomics Corp., 309 So. 2d at 584 (testimony contradicting contract
terms was sufficient to send a factual dispute to the jury); cf. Hoffman v. Robinson, 213 So. 2d
267, 268 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968) (a stock option compensation agreement stating "this agreement
shall be in force for a period of twenty-five (25) years from the date hereof" within a terminable
at-will employment agreement did not create an employment agreement of a definite duration).
128. See Raytheon Subsidiary Support Co. v. Crouch, 548 So. 2d 781, 782-84 (Fla. 4th DCA
1989) (agreement stating "[y]our assignment has been extended for twelve months commencing
on August 20, 1977" created a valid employment contract).
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an employee's expectations of the employment time frame, albeit en-
couraged by the employer, have been insufficient to establish a defi-
nite term of employment. 129 In addition, a company policy of yearly
reviews was held not to have created a series of annual employment
contracts subject to satisfactory performance by the employee.'3 0 Fi-
nally, regardless of the existence of a valid employment contract of a
definite duration, establishing probationary and temporary employ-
ment periods may forestall the onset of a definite employment pe-
riod. 3'
B. Consideration
"[In the absence of.. . good consideration additional to the serv-
ices contracted [for], a contract for permanent employment . . . is no
more than an indefinite general hiring terminable at the will of either
party.' 32 In Florida, relinquishing prior employment cannot be con-
sideration to support a lifetime employment contract.'33 The reasoning
for this is that employees could, throughout their stay at their new
job, be said to have relinquished such prior employment for the new
job. 134 It is presumed that an employee must relinquish such prior em-
ployment to accept the new position. The act of relinquishment does
129. See Roy Jorgensen Assocs., 409 So. 2d at 1190 (contract providing that employee was
to be transferred to Ecuador "for a period of 28 months" was merely language of expectation,
not language creating a definite term of employment); Maguire v. American Fam. Life Assur-
ance Co., 442 So. 2d 321, 323 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (insurance agent canceled California license at
the behest of employer insurance company in reliance on employer's sponsorship for Florida
license. Court held that employer's breach of promise resulting in employee's loss of license and
renewal income did not comprise cause of action without a binding definite term of employ-
ment), rev. denied, 451 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 1984). Cf Vienneau v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 548
So. 2d 856, 859 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989) (contract stating that employee's "transfer will be tempo-
rary in nature for a thirty-six month period" created more than a mere expectation of employ-
ment and therefore may allow a cause of action for wrongful discharge).
130. Muller v. Stromberg Carlson Corp., 427 So. 2d 266, 268 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).
131. Critchlow v. WFC Mortgage Co., 315 So. 2d 483, 484 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); see also
discussion supra part III.B.7.
132. Russell & Axon v. Handshoe, 176 So. 2d 909, 915 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965) (quoting Anno-
tation, Duration of Contract Purporting to be For Permanent Employment, 35 ALR 1432
(1925)), cert. denied, 188 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 1966); see also 3A CoRatN, supra note 3, § 684 (1963)
("[11f the employee gives a sufficient consideration for the employee's promise, the lack of mu-
tuality of obligation is immaterial." (emphasis added)). Brodie, supra note 5, at 596-97. But see
Bayshore Royal Co. v. Doran Jason Co., 480 So. 2d 651, 656 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (quoting 11
FLA. JuR. 2D Contracts § 63 at 355-57 (1979) ("Consideration is sufficient if the promisee, in
return for the promise does anything legal which he is not bound to do . (emphasis
added)).
133. See Hesston Corp. v. Roche, 599 So. 2d 148, 152 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992).
134. Knudsen v. Green, 156 So. 240, 242-43 (Fla. 1934).
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not constitute consideration. "' Finally, there can be no award for
damages based on the relinquishment of prior employmentY.3 6
Employers have a common law duty to give "reasonable notice" of
termination to employees.'37 Accordingly, they have a preexisting obli-
gation to provide this "reasonable notice." Since preexisting obliga-
tions cannot constitute good consideration' 38 Florida courts should
hold that "reasonable notice" cannot be consideration for a valid em-
ployment contract. Nevertheless, Florida courts have held that the ob-
ligation on an employer to give "written notice" of termination could
constitute consideration on the part of the employer to support an
employment contract. t39
By permitting an employee to continue his employment, rather than
exercising the right to terminate the employee at-will, the employer
has given adequate consideration to support an employment
contract' 4 as well as a noncompete clause.14' However, Florida does
not recognize an employee's continued work performance as an em-
ployee's valid consideration supporting an employment contract. 42
Under common law, it is axiomatic that either party's change of
position can be the detrimental reliance providing the necessary con-
sideration for a contract. Nonetheless, Florida does not recognize an
employee's change of position as giving rise to such detrimental reli-
ance. 14 However, Florida has recognized that an employer's change
135. See id. at 243.
136. Id.
137. Florida-Georgia Chem. Co. v. National Labs., Inc., 153 So. 2d 752, 754 (Fla. 1st DCA
1963); Perri v. Byrd, 436 So. 2d 359, 361 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Malver v. Sheffield Indus., 462
So. 2d 567, 568 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Crawford v. David Shapiro & Co., 490 So. 2d 993, 996
(Fla. 3d DCA 1986).
138. See Slattery v. Wells Fargo Armored Serv. Corp., 366 So. 2d 157, 159 (Fla. 3d DCA
1979) ("The performance of a pre-existing duty does not amount to the consideration necessary
to support a contract.") (citing Brinson v. Herlong, 164 So. 137 (Fla. 1935)).
139. See Wright & Seaton, Inc. v. Prescott, 420 So. 2d 623, 624-25 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983).
140. Id. at 628 (citing Tasty Box Lunch Co. v. Kennedy, 121 So. 2d 52, 54 (Fla. 3d DCA
1960)).
141. See Coastal Unilube, Inc. v. Smith, 598 So. 2d 200, 201 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992); Tasty
Box Lunch Co., 121 So. 2d at 54; Criss v. Davis, Presser, & LaFaye, P.A., 494 So. 2d 525, 527
(Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 501 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. 1986).
142. See Hope v. National Airlines, 99 So. 2d 244, 246 (Fla. 3d. DCA 1957) (holding that
continued employment during a strike merely constitutes personal services and does not provide
sufficient consideration to effect a binding contract).
143. Maguire v. American Fain. Life Assurance Co., 442 So. 2d 321, 323 (Fla. 3d DCA
1983), rev. denied, 451 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 1984) (holding that no enforceable employment contract
existed due to absence of definite term of employment even though insurance agent, in detrimen-
tal reliance upon his employer's promise that he would be allowed to transfer to Florida, can-
celed his California license).
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of position will give rise to such detrimental reliance, thus providing
consideration for the contract. '44
Finally, it should be noted that the act of selling a business provides
adequate consideration on the seller's part that will support a business
purchaser's promise given as part of the business sale agreement; in
this case the promise was to employ the business seller, and the dura-
tion of the employment was contingent on an act to be performed by
the business purchaser.m45
C. Mutuality of Obligation
Contracts which are enforceable against one party only are said to
lack mutuality.146 The court in Wright & Seaton, Inc. v. Prescott147
explained the rationale:
[a]s an [sic] unilateral contract is not founded on mutual promises,
the doctrine of mutuality is inapplicable to such a contract. It is
applicable, however, to a bilateral contract containing mutual
executory promises because there both parties are bound by
reciprocal obligations and the promise of one is the consideration for
the promise of the other. 41
More succinctly, "[A] contract [which] could not have been enforced
[by an employer] against [an employee] was lacking in mutuality.
Consequently, [an employee] can not enforce it against [an em-
ployer]."'149
Additionally, mutuality of obligation measures the inherent fairness
of a contract by balancing comparable commitments of the contract-
ing parties.15 0 However:
The legal principle that contracts must be mutual does not mean that
in every case each party must have the same remedy for a breach as
144. Wright & Seaton, Inc. v. Prescott, 420 So. 2d 623, 626-27 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)
("[T]here was complete performance by appellant of what it had promised to do in exchange for
appellee's promise not to compete; as a result appellee's promise not to compete became binding
upon him and enforceable by injunction.").
145. Venus Lab., Inc. v. Katz, 601 So. 2d 630, 631 (Fla. 3d DCA) (holding that a purchas-
er's promise to employ the former owner until the company completed payments to the owner
was adequate consideration in exchange for the owner's promise to sell), rev. denied, 613 So. 2d
12 (Fla. 1992).
146. See generally, 1A CORBIN, supra note 3, § 152 n. 11.20 (1963).
147. 420 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983).
148. Id. at 625 (citing Meurer Steel Barrel Co. v. Martin, 1 F.2d 687, 688 (3d Cir. 1924)); see
also 3A CORBIN, supra note 3, § 684 (1963) ("[i]f the employee gives sufficient consideration for
the employee's promise, the lack of mutuality of obligation is immaterial.").
149. Hope v. National Airlines, 99 So. 2d 244, 247 (Fla. 3d DCA 1957).
150. See Hesston Corp. v. Roche, 599 So. 2d 148, 151 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992).
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the other. Mere difference in the right stipulated for does not destroy
mutuality of remedy . . . so long as the bounds of reasonableness
and fairness are not transgressed. 5'
Florida courts distinguish between consideration supplied for the
executory portion of contracts and consideration supplied for the exe-
cuted portion of contracts. 1 2 Florida holds the executory features of
contracts to be void for lack of consideration and lack of mutuality.,
For example, an employer's promise to employ an employee for life,
in exchange for the employee's act of crossing a picket line for the
employer, was held to be an unenforceable agreement because of lack
of mutuality.'5 4 Further, one court held that a contract lacked mutual-
ity because the employer could not require the employee to remain at
a job for a fixed period of time-this precluded the employee from
claiming permanent employment."'
The extended discussion in Wright & Seaton, Inc. v. Prescott'56 re-
garding written notice as consideration states that written notice is
valid consideration binding an employee to a noncompete agree-
ment. 5 7 Further, it was immaterial to the Wright & Seaton court that
the written notice requirement was not even part of the employment
contract."' Simply, the court held that an employee's obligation under
a written employment contract was valid,5 9 despite a contractual fact
pattern similar to those voided by other courts for lack of mutuality
and indefiniteness. 160
D. Statute of Frauds
Employment contracts that are "not to be performed within the
space of one year from" the making thereof, must comply with the
151. Thompson v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 178 So. 413, 419 (Fla. 1938) (quoting 32 C.J.
Injunctions § 297).
152. See Hope, 99 So. 2d at 246 (citing I CoRBIN, supra note 3, § 152 (1950)).
153. See Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Orange Crush Co., 296 F. 693, 694 (5th Cir.
1924); Wright & Seaton, Inc. v. Prescott, 420 So. 2d 623, 626 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); Pick Kwik
Food Stores, Inc. v. Tenser, 407 So. 2d 216, 218 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981), rev. denied, 415 So. 2d
1361 (Fla. 1982).
154. See Hope, 99 So. 2d at 246 (holding that employee's promise to work during a strike
effectively promised nothing since he could terminate his employment at any time).
155. Russell & Axon v. Handshoe, 176 So. 2d 909, 916 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965).
156. 420 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See Russell & Axon v. Handshoe, 176 So. 2d 909, 916 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965), cert. de-
nied, 188 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 1966).
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statute of frauds.'6' Florida follows the majority rule regarding life-
time employment contracts which is that the statute of frauds does not
apply because "death is uncertain and the contract could therefore
terminate prior to the expiration of one year.' ' 62 Finally, oral con-
tracts for an indefinite period of time likewise do not have to comply
with the statute of frauds. 3
E. Other Provisions
1. Arbitration Clauses
"It is well settled that, in order to preserve the integrity of the arbi-
tration process, 'courts will not review the finding of facts contained
in an award, and will never undertake to substitute their judgment for
that of the arbitrators."'"6
Parties are bound by procedures set forth in contracts and collective
bargaining agreements made by the parties' designated agents. 15 Re-
gardless of which party initiates a collective bargaining agreement
containing an arbitration clause, and which party subsequently pur-
sues a grievance in conformity with the procedures within the arbitra-
tion agreement, the decision of the designated arbitrator is final and
binding. 16
2. Lifetime Contracts and the "Doctrine of Additional
Consideration"
Lifetime employment contracts require "additional consideration"
on the part of the employee, 67 given at the inception of employ-
ment. 68 Lifetime employment contracts need this "additional consid-
eration" because employers cannot require employees to remain
within their employment for a fixed period of time.169 This further
161. FLA. STAT. § 725.01 (1991), construed in Hesston Corp. v. Roche, 599 So. 2d 148, 152
(Fla. 5th DCA 1992).
162. Hesston Corp., 599 So. 2d at 152 (citing Schenkel v. Atlantic Nat'l Bank of Jackson-
ville, 141 So. 2d 327, 330 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 148 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 1962)).
163. Id. (citing Johnson v. Edwards, 569 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)).
164. Fraternal Order of Police v. Miami, 598 So. 2d 89, 91 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (citing Og-
den v. Baile, 75 So. 794, 797 (Fla. 1917)).
165. Heath v. Central Truck Lines, Inc., 195 So. 2d 588, 590 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967); Koenig v.
Tyler, 360 So. 2d 104, 106 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
166. Fraternal Order of Police, 598 So. 2d at 91.
167. Russell & Axon v. Handshoe, 176 So. 2d 909, 916 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965); Hesston Corp.,
599 So. 2d at 151.
168. Lurton v. Muldon, 523 So. 2d 706, 708-09 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).
169. Russell& Axon, 176So. 2d at 916.
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consideration gives the contract mutuality and thus allows the em-
ployee to claim permanent employment. 70 This is called the "doctrine
of additional consideration."' 7' "[ijndependent consideration to sup-
port the 'lifetime' employment promise must be present and that relin-
quishment of another position, even a better paying position, is
insufficient. "1 72 The doctrine of "additional consideration" as applied
to employment contracts, specifically requires collateral consideration
only, and excludes performance based consideration.' 73 Collateral
consideration approved as "additional consideration" so far has been
limited to the employee's bringing along and giving to the employer
the rights to the employee's patented product. 74
3. Employment Manuals
In Florida, provisions within employment manuals are not necessar-
ily binding on employees or employers. The trial court must make an
initial determination of whether the provisions/personnel policies are
a part of an employment contract before holding them enforceable as
part of the employment relationship. 17 Employment manuals are con-
sidered to be "mere unilateral expectations, rather than explicit mu-
tual promises necessary to create a binding contractual term.' 1 76
However, where courts have found evidence of "hospital literature"
describing benefits available to "permanent part-time employees,"
and signed applications disavowing the employer's commitment to
any specific period of employment, they have permitted the case to
reach the fact-finder. 177
Some courts have held employment manuals to be nothing more
than non-binding, non-enforceable statements of company policy. 7 1
Letters, executive memoranda, and employee handbooks that assure
170. Id.
171. Lurton, 523 So. 2d at 708-09.
172. Hesston Corp., 599 So. 2d at 152.
173. Chatelier v. Robertson, 118 So. 2d 241, 243 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960) (holding that employ-
ee's lifetime employment was a condition of the contract for the sale of his plant food business
to his employer).
174. Id.
175. Muller v. Stromberg Carlson Corp., 427 So. 2d 266, 270 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Falls v.
Lawnwood Medical Ctr., 427 So. 2d 361, 362 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); McConnell v. Eastern Air
Lines, Inc., 499 So. 2d 68, 69 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986).
176. Bryant v. Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, 479 So. 2d 165, 168 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985);
see also Muller, 427 So. 2d at 270; Michael W. Hawkins, Employment At Will: A Survey, 39
LAB. L.J. 525, 527 n.ll (1988) (citing Caster v. Hennessey, 727 F.2d 1075 (11th Cir. 1984));
LaRocca v. Xerox Corp., 587 F. Supp. 1002, 1004. (S.D. Fla. 1984).
177. Nunes v. Margate Gen. Hosp., Inc., 435 So. 2d 916, 917 (F1. 4th DCA 1983).
178. Lurton v. Muldon, 523 So. 2d 706, 708-09 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Olsen v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 759 F. Supp. 782, 786 (S.D. Fla. 1984); see generally Brodie, supra note 5, at 599.
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employees of the right to a for-cause termination are not enforceable
"without more.' ' 79 Presumably, the "more" means evidence of an
employer's intent to incorporate the terms of the manual into the con-
tract. An employee's continued employment is not valid consideration
for promises in an employment manual given to the employee after
the commencement of employment. 180
V. COURTS' CONSTRUCTION OF WRITTEN AND ORAL EMPLOYMENT
CONTRACTS
"It is a question of law for the court to determine what would con-
stitute a breach of the contract and then a question of fact for the jury
to determine as to whether or not that thing which would constitute a
breach of the contract has occurred."18'
A. Construing Written Contracts
Courts have the duty of construing written contracts.8 2 Unable to
shift this burden to the jury, the court itself must construe the con-
tract and then inform the jury of the construction.'83 The jury, never-
theless, may determine narrow questions stipulated by the parties'8 4
and factual disputes where contract terms are contradicted by testi-
mony. 85 In contrast, the jury is to factually determine the literal terms
or the actual language of an oral contract. 8 6
The general rules of contract construction in Florida instruct courts
to ascertain the intent of the parties by examining "the total instru-
ment" and to construe various provisions so as to give effect to
each; 87 constructions which lead to absurd conclusions must be aban-
doned in favor of constructions consistent with "reason and probabil-
179. Muller, 427 So. 2d at 270; McConnell, 499 So. 2d at 69.
180. Stough v. Gallagher, 967 F.2d 1523, 1530 (11 th Cir. 1992) (citing Caster v. Hennessey,
727 F.2d 1075 (1 1th Cir. 1984)).
181. Haiman v. Gundersheimer, 177 So. 199, 201 (Fla. 1937).
182. Id. at 200-01; Paddock v. Bay Concrete Indus., 154 So. 2d 313, 316 (Fla. 2d DCA
1963); Vienneau v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 548 So. 2d 856, 859 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989).
183. See Paddock, 154 So. 2d at 316 (citing Leesburg v. Hall, 117 So. 840 (Fla. 1928)).
184. See Russell & Axon v. Handshoe, 176 So. 2d 909, 912 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965), cert. de-
nied, 188 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 1966).
185. American Agronomics Corp. v. Ross, 309 So. 2d 582, 584 (Fla. 3d DCA) (holding that
contradictory evidence of a written contract containing the exact start date for the period of
employment and testimony contradicting contract terms regarding the duration of employment
was sufficient to send factual dispute to jury), cert. denied, 321 So. 2d 558 (Fla. 1975).
186. Dickinson v. Auto Ctr. Mfg. Co., 594 F.2d 523, 529-30 (5th Cir. 1979) (applying Flor-
ida law).
187. See Paddock, 154 So. 2d at 315-16; Roy Jorgensen Assocs. v. Deschenes, 409 So. 2d
1188, 1190 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).
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ity; ' 188 courts may not construe clear and unambiguous language to
mean something other than that expressed; 8 9 courts have no power to
remake contracts; '90and unambiguous agreements must be enforced
according to their terms. 91 Courts may also consider the parties' inter-
pretations of uncertain or doubtful terms where the interpretations are
"not completely at variance with the principles of correct legal inter-
pretations of the contract provisions." 192
Florida courts construe employment contracts according to the fol-
lowing rules:
(1) the contract should not be held void for uncertainty unless
indefiniteness reaches a point where construction becomes futile; (2)
ambiguities are to be construed against the drafter; (3) the conduct
of the parties through their course of dealings shall be considered to
determine the meaning of the written agreement where the terms are
in doubt; (4) the objects to be accomplished shall be considered, and
to this end the court shall place itself in the position of the parties
when the contract was entered into; (5) the interpretation of the
contract should be consistent with reason, probability, and the
practical aspects of the transaction; and (6) the contract should be
considered as a whole, not in its isolated parts. 93
Because an employment contract must contain a definite term of
employment to avoid being an at-will contract, the existence of an ac-
tual employment time frame in the contract can be determinative of
the contract's validity. Determining such a time frame depends upon a
reading of the entire contract. 194 Additionally, oral evidence may be
introduced to show that the terms of the written agreement did not
encompass the entire agreement, and that such parole evidence needs
to be admitted in order to prove fraudulent inducement in signing the
written employment contract. 95
Construing Oral Contracts
Determining the literal terms or language of an oral contract is the
responsibility of the factfinder, 19 in contrast to the court's being re-
sponsible for construing written contracts.197
188. See Paddock, 154 So. 2d at 315-16.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. American Agronomics Corp. v. Ross, 309 So. 2d 582, 584 (Fla. 3d DCA) (citing Bou-
den v. Walker, 266 So. 2d 353, 354 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972)), cert. denied, 321 So. 2d 558 (Fla.
1975).
193. Maines v. Davis, 491 So. 2d 1233, 1235 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (citations omitted).
194. Roy Jorgensen Assocs. v. Deschenes, 409 So. 2d 1188, 1190 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).
195. Elmore v. Vatrano, 485 So. 2d 888, 890 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).
196. Dickinson v. Auto Ctr. Mfg. Co., 594 F.2d 523, 529 (5th Cir. 1979) (applying Florida
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VI. COMMON LAW EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP DUTIES
A. Employees' Common Law Fiduciary Duties
Implicit in every employment contract is the requirement that the
employee faithfully perform the duties demanded by the employer in a
manner directed by the employer.198 The most fundamental of fiduci-
ary duties is the duty of employees not to deal for their own benefit
while employed by someone else.'" Employees may not commit dis-
loyal acts in anticipation of future competition.2°° During their em-
ployment, employees may not enter into a business that competes with
the employer's business and keep for themselves the profits from the
competing business. 20' However, employees may make "arrangements
to compete" prior to leaving their current employment and they have
no duty to disclose such plans. 202
One example of a duty hovering on the outskirts of employees' im-
plicit common law fiduciary duties is the duty not to falsify warranties
and representations when selling a business. Ostensibly, this is appli-
cable and remediable only when the seller has stayed on to work for
the new owner as an employee.203
There is also an implied duty not to use confidential information
gained in the course of employment such as trade secrets, secret de-
signs, plans, and certain customer lists. 204 Finally, employees have a
law); see Juvenile Diabetes Research Found. v. Rievman, 370 So. 2d 33, 37 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
(upholding an oral employment contract).
197. Paddock v. Bay Concrete Indus., Inc., 154 So. 2d 313, 315 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963) (citing
Leesburg v. Hall, 117 So. 840 (Fla. 1928)).
198. Haiman v. Gundersheimer, 177 So. 199, 201 (Fla. 1937).
199. United States v. Bowen, 290 F.2d 40, 42 (5th Cir. 1961); Phillips Chem. Co. v. Morgan,
440 So. 2d 1292, 1293 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).
200. See Insurance Field Servs. v. White & White Inspection & Audit Serv., 384 So. 2d 303,
307-08 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
201. Singletary v. Mann, 24 So. 2d 718, 723 (Fla. 1946); see also New World Fashions, Inc.
v. Lieberman, 429 So. 2d 1276, 1277 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); In re Hallmark Builders, Inc., 57
B.R. 121, 123 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1986).
202. See New World Fashions, 429 So. 2d at 1277.
203. Austin's Rack, Inc. v. Austin, 396 So. 2d 1161, 1162-63 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 402
So. 2d 607 (Fla. 1981).
204. Bert Lane Co. v. International Indus., 84 So. 2d 5, 7 (Fla. 1955); Unistar Corp. v.
Child, 415 So. 2d 733, 734 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). But see Fish v. Adams, 401 So. 2d 843, 845 (Fla.
5th DCA 1981) (holding that the planning and formation of a competing business does not
breach employee's implied duty where no confidential information is used); Templeton v. Crea-
tive Loafing Tampa, Inc., 552 So. 2d 288, 289-90 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (holding that customer
lists developed by the employee may not constitute trade secrets).
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duty not to attempt to or to conspire to lure away existing fellow em-
ployees in order to hire them for a future competitive business. 05
B. Employers' Common Law Duties to Employees
As discussed previously, Florida employers owe employees "reason-
able notice" before termination .2D6
C. Employers' Common Law Duties to Third Parties
An employer may be held liable for an employee's acts if the em-
ployer fails to make a reasonable inquiry into the employee's back-
ground. 207 The general rule is that employers are liable for their
employees' acts if such acts are performed in furtherance of the em-
ployers' interests. 20 8 However, employers have even been held liable
for their employees' criminal acts which were not done in furtherance
of their employers' interests where the employee's actions were fore-
seeable, or would have been foreseeable had the employer made a rea-
sonable inquiry into the employee's background. 209 For example, if
employees commit offenses similar to offenses already on their crimi-
nal record, employers will be considered to have been on notice of
such employees' criminal records, and are thus held liable for their
employees' actions. 210 Therefore, employers should make a reasonable
205. See Fish, 401 So. 2d at 845; Puga v. Suave Shoe Corp., 427 So. 2d 288, 289 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1983); Security Title & Abstract, Inc. v. First Amer. Title Ins. Co., 414 So. 2d 604, 605
(Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
Third parties are also liable in tort along with employees for such conspiracy. See Phillips
Chem. Co. v. Morgan, 440 So. 2d 1292, 1293 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), rev. denied sub nom. Gamble
v. Phillips Chem. Co., 450 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 1984).
206. See Florida-Georgia Chem. Co. v. National Labs., Inc., 153 So. 2d 752, 754 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1963) (noting that contracts for an indefinite period "may be terminated at will on giving
reasonable notice"); Perri v. Byrd, 436 So. 2d 359, 361 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Malver v. Sheffield
Indus., 462 So. 2d 567, 568 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Crawford v. David Shapiro & Co., 490 So. 2d
993, 996 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); see also Wright & Seaton, Inc. v. Prescott, 420 So. 2d 623, 626
(Fla. 4th DCA 1983) (discussing written notice). However, upon terminating an employee, a
Florida employer may not have to pay any outstanding commissions. Cueto v. John Allmand
Boats, Inc., 334 So. 2d 30, 31 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976).
207. See Williams v. Feather Sound, Inc., 386 So. 2d 1238, 1240 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980) (hold-
ing that an employer has a duty to make a "reasonable inquiry" into the background of an
employee who will have access to tenants' homes), rev. denied, 392 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1981);
Abbott v. Payne, 457 So. 2d 1156, 1157 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (holding that an employer must
make a reasonable background check of an employee who will have free access to customers'
homes).
208. See supra notes 109-112 and accompanying text.
209. Tallahassee Furniture Co. v. Harrison, 583 So. 2d 744, 750-51 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), rev.
denied, 595 So. 2d 558 (Fla. 1992).
210. Island City Flying Serv. v. General Elec. Credit Corp., 585 So. 2d 274, 276-77 (Fla.
1991).
1993]
196 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 21:167
inquiry into their employees' backgrounds to limit the liability arising
from their employees' acts, even if such acts were crimes not done in
furtherance of employers' interests.2 11
VII. NON-CONTRACTUAL CAUSES OF ACTION
A. Claims Sounding in Tort
A court may enjoin tortious interference with a business or employ-
ment relationship by an employee2 12 or employer2 13 and, where appro-
priate, award damages for such interference. 2 4 Courts will recognize
as a defense defendants' proof that the interference involved lawful
competition.21
1. Employers' Claims
The law will import into every contract of employment a prohibi-
tion against employees using trade secrets for their own benefit to the
detriment of the employer. 21 6 If the defendant in a tortious interfer-
ence action is an employee, customer lists, when distilled from larger
customer lists compiled with considerable effort, qualify as trade se-
crets and their use may be enjoined and damages awarded. 27 Never-
theless, employees may use contacts, expertise, and customer lists
which they developed during the course of their employment. 218
2. Employees' Claims
Employees may have a cause of action in tort for fraudulent induce-
ment to contract despite a court's finding that the employee's dis-
missal due to the employer's closing of a portion of a business
constituted valid dismissal "for cause." 2 9 Key language used by the
211. Williams, 386 So. 2d at 1240-41; Abbott, 457 So. 2d at 1157.
212. Unistar Corp. v. Child, 415 So. 2d 733, 735 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
213. It is important to note that, in Florida, a party to a business or employment relationship
cannot be liable for tortiously interfering with that relationship if the party was acting within the
scope of his duties within the relationship, regardless of whether the relationship is contractual
or noncontractual. Muller v. Stromberg Carlson Corp., 427 So. 2d 266, 271 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).
214. See Insurance Field Servs. v. White & White Inspection & Audit Serv., 384 So. 2d 303,
308 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
215. See Perez v. Rivero, 534 So. 2d 914, 916 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Unistar Corp., 415 So. 2d
at 734.
216. See Perez, 534 So. 2d at 916; Unistar Corp., 415 So. 2d at 734.
217. See Unistar Corp., 415 So. 2d at 734.
218. See Templeton v. Creative Loafing Tampa, Inc., 552 So. 2d 288, 289-90 (Fla. 2d DCA
1989).
219. See Telesphere Int'l, Inc. v. Scollin, 489 So. 2d 1152, 1153-54 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. de-
nied, 500 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 1986).
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court in holding fraudulent inducement claims valid is if ". . .the
promise [of employment] is made without any intention of performing
or made with the positive intention not to perform." 220 In addition,
employees may have a cause of action for fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion regarding the terms and conditions of the new job. 22' However,
there is no cause of action sounding in tort for a violation of the pub-
lic policy expressed in Florida's "Right to Work" statute. 22
Further, there is no cause of action for tort claims derived from
contract claims for such as retaliatory discharge23 or for mental an-
guish derived from contract breach. 224 Yet, this does not preclude an
employee from maintaining a cause of action for intentional infliction
of emotional distress if committed within the employment relation-
ship .22
B. Statutory Causes of Action
An employee has a statutory cause of action for wrongful discharge
when the employee is discharged (1) for pursuing a worker's compen-
sation claim;226 (2) serving on a state jury trial;227 (3) for membership
in a labor union; 2 (4) for discharge on the basis of race, color, relig-
220. See Hamlen v. Fairchild Indus., 413 So. 2d 800, 802 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
221. Telesphere Int'l, Inc., 489 So. 2d at 1154.
222. See Catania v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 381 So. 2d 265, 267 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (con-
struing FLA. STAT. § 447.01 (1979)).
223. Smith v. Piezo Tech. & Prof. Adm'rs, 427 So. 2d 182, 184 (Fla. 1983); Segal v. Arrow
Indus. Corp., 364 So. 2d 89, 90 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); OCHAB v. Morrison, Inc., 517 So. 2d 763,
764 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); Hartley v. Ocean Reef Club, Inc., 476 So. 2d 1327, 1330 (Fla. 3d DCA
1985); Jarvinen v. HCA Allied Clinical Lab., Inc., 552 So. 2d 241, 242 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989).
224. DeMarco v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 360 So. 2d 134, 136 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), cert.
denied, 367 So. 2d 1123 (Fla. 1979), aff'd, 384 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1980); see also Kirksey v.
Jernigan, 45 So. 2d 188, 189 (Fla. 1950) ("IT]here can be no recovery for mental pain and
anguish unconnected with physical injury in an action arising out of the negligent breach of a
contract whereby simple negligence is involved.") (emphasis added); Henry Morrison Flagler
Museum v. Lee, 268 So. 2d 434, 436 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972) (holding that mental anguish is not
recoverable even where it results from a "willful and flagrant" breach of contract).
225. See Henry Morrison Flagler Museum, 268 So. 2d at 434 (quoting Griffith v. Shamrock
Village, 94 So. 2d 854, 858 (Fla. 1957)).
226. FLA. STAT. § 440.205 (1983); Smith, 427 So. 2d at 182-84; see also Notarian v. Planta-
tion AMC Jeep, Inc., 567 So. 2d 1034, 1035 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990).
227. See Hill v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 699 F. Supp. 876, 877 (M.D. Fla. 1988) (interpret-
ing FLA. STAT. § 40.271 (1987) to extend protection to employees from discharge on account of
state, but not federal, jury service), aff'd and rev'd in part on other grounds, 934 F.2d 1518
(I1th Cir. 1991). Cf. Scott v. Estalella, 563 So. 2d 701, 704 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (Cope, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that FLA. STAT. § 40.271 (1987) was also intended to protect employees from
discharge for fulfilling federal jury service).
228. FLA. STAT. § 447.17(1) (1983).
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ion, sex, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status; 229 and (5)
for wage discrimination on the basis of sex.230
Public employees may maintain statutory causes of action against
county or municipal employers if their discharge was based on per-
sonal characteristics,23 and against state or state governmental subdi-
vision employers if based on age. 2 2 Additionally, law enforcement
and correction officers may maintain a statutory cause of action for
retaliatory discharge for the officer's expression of the rights enumer-
ated in section 112.532(1), Florida Statutes.233
Recently, the Florida Supreme Court, in Scott v. Otis Elevator
Co. ,234 held that if an employer intentionally violates section 440.205,
Florida Statutes, by wrongfully discharging an employee for filing a
Worker's Compensation claim, the employee may maintain a cause of
action for infliction of emotional distress. 235 The Scott court reasoned
that because an employer who discharges an employee in violation of
section 440.205 is committing an intentional tort, the employer is lia-
ble for damages resulting from the concomitant tort of intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress. 23 6 Although the holding in this case only
addressed the applicability of this reasoning in cases involving wrong-
ful discharge for filing Worker's Compensation claims, the same rea-
soning appears to justify plaintiffs' claims for emotional distress
arising from violations of any of the previously identified employ-
ment-related statutes.
VIII. REMEDIES
"[A] cause of action immediately arises upon the wrongful dis-
charge of an employ6 under contract for a definite time, and it is not
229. Id. § 760. 10(l)(a).
230. Id. § 448.07(2)(b).
231. Id. § 112.042(1) (1991). These characteristics currently include "race, color, national
origin, sex, handicap, or religious creed." Id.
232. Id. § 112.044(4).
233. Id. § 112.532(1), (5) (1987); see also Sylvester v. Delray Beach, 584 So. 2d 214, 215 (Fla.
4th DCA 1991) (holding that section §112.532(5) provides injunctive relief but not damages). But
see Stough v. Gallagher, 967 F.2d 1523, 1530 (1 1th Cir. 1992) ("Florida deputy sheriffs have no
property or liberty interests in their positions for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
Note the "Policeman's Bill of Rights" provides remedies for police seeking injunctive relief
from their employers-this has been limited to reinstatement and back-pay (but not damages).
FLA. STAT. § 112.532(5) (1987).
234. 572 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1990).
235. Id.; see also Henry Morrison Flagler Museum v. Lee, 268 So. 2d 434, 436-37 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1972) (noting that recovery for mental anguish requires more than simple breach of con-
tract); DeMarco v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 360 So. 2d 134, 136 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), cert.
denied, 367 So. 2d 1123 (Fla. 1979), aff'd, 384 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1980).
236. Scott, 572 So. 2d at 903; see generally Comment, Workers' Compensation: Florida's
Resistance to Nonstatutory Limits to the Employment-At- Will Doctrine, 43 U. FLA. L. REv. 583
(1991).
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necessary to await the termination of that period before asking the
courts for redress.
'237
A. Equitable Relief
Employers enforce employment contracts in equity, through nega-
tive injunctions. 28 For example, courts prohibit employees from com-
peting with employers in violation of noncompete agreements. 2 9 In
addition, a court may enjoin an employee's tortious interference in a
business relationship and order an accounting of profits by the em-
ployee as a result of his interference,24 and/or award damages to the
employer. 24'
B. Damages
In a breach of an employment contract action, the plaintiff has the
burden of proving the amount of damages suffered as a result of the
breach.2 42 When an employment contract of a specific duration is
breached, damages are measured by "wages for the unexpired part of
the term, including, of course, any unpaid balance due under the con-
tract at the time of discharge for services already performed.''243 Fur-
ther, when an employer breaches his promise to promote an employee
to a higher-paying position if the employee will leave his current em-
ployment, the employee must prove the salary of the new position,
"not the loss of advantages derived from another contract between
the servant and [his] previous employer" to determine the necessary
damages. 2" Courts have also awarded damages and prejudgment in-
terest to an employee for an employer's anticipatory breach of an em-
ployment contract, 24 as well as for breach of an employment contract
extension.2 "
237. Harris v. Cocoanut Grove Dev. Co., 59 So. 11, 11 (Fla. 1912).
238. See BAKALY & GROSSMAN, supra note 46, at 1.2, 5-7.
239. See discussion supra part III.B. 1.
240. See New World Fashions, Inc. v. Lieberman, 429 So. 2d 1276, 1277 (Fla. 1st DCA
1983).
241. See Insurance Field Servs. v. White & White Inspection & Audit Serv., 384 So. 2d 303,
308 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
242. See Juvenile Diabetes Res. Found. v. Rievman, 370 So. 2d 33, 36 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
243. Hazen v. Cobb, 117 So. 853, 859 (Fla. 1928).
244. See Servamerica, Inc. v. Rolfe, 318 So. 2d 178, 180 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975) (quoting Knud-
sen v. Green 156 So. 240, 242-43 (Fla. 1934)).
245. See Venus Lab., Inc. v. Katz, 601 So. 2d 630, 631-32 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 613
So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1992).
246. See Raytheon Subsidiary Support Co. v. Crouch, 548 So. 2d 781, 782 (Fla. 4th DCA
1989) (holding that employee who was given an extension of his employment contract could
recover damages and interest when the employer breached this extension).
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Unlike in a breach of contract action, it is unnecessary to prove
damages as a prerequisite for a court's finding that an employee was
wrongfully discharged. However, if an employee is found to have
been wrongfully discharged, the employee may recover damages.
Courts have also awarded damages to compensate an employee for
lack of reasonable notice of termination, provided the parties reasona-
bly contemplated such a provision during contract negotiations even
though only an at-will relationship existed at that time.2 4 7
Courts may calculate damages by treating the contract as continu-
ing and determining the amount of the contract price or wages for the
unexpired portion of the term.m Further, an employer is entitled to
an accounting for the profits received by an employee due to the em-
ployee's breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the employer.2 49 The court
determines the right to an accounting, if there is such a right, and then
determines the appropriate amount.2 0
1. Employees' Duty to Mitigate
"As a general proposition a wrongfully discharged employee is not
obligated to seek other employment.""'' The damages recoverable,
however, will be reduced by the income the discharged employee
earned,22 to the extent they were not produced by additional labor
and effort beyond that required by the original contract. 2 3 Therefore,
it is often said that an employee has a duty to mitigate damages by
earning income "through the use of due diligence in other employ-
ment of like nature," for the remainder of the contract term .214 This
duty to mitigate, however, does not require taking a job below the
appropriate skill level 25 or one which requires labor and effort beyond
247. See Florida-Georgia Chem. Co. v. National Labs., Inc., 153 So. 2d 752, 754 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1963); Perri v. Byrd, 436 So. 2d 359, 361 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Malver v. Sheffield Indus.,
462 So. 2d 567, 568 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Crawford v. David Shapiro & Co., 490 So. 2d 993, 996
(Fla. 3d DCA 1986).
248. Hazen v. Cobb, 117 So. 853, 859 (Fla. 1928).
249. See New World Fashions, Inc. v. Lieberman, 429 So. 2d 1276, 1277 (Fla. 1st DCA
1983).
250. Id.
251. Punkar v. King Plastic Corp., 290 So. 2d 505, 508 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert. denied, 297 So.
2d 30 (Fla. 1974).
252. Reed Constr. Corp. v. Zimmerman, 133 So. 2d 579, 580 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961); Southern
Keswick, Inc. v. Whetherholt, 293 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974); Juvenile Diabetes Res.
Found. v. Rievman, 370 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Zayre v. Creech, 497 So. 2d 706, 707-08
(Fla. 4th DCA 1984).
253. Punkar, 290 So. 2d at 508.
254. See Juvenile Diabetes Res. Found., 370 So. 2d at 36.
255. See Punkar, 290 So. 2d at 508.
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that required by the original contract. 2 6 Mitigation is an affirmative
defense with the burden of proof by the greater weight of the evidence
placed on the employer. 257
C. Liquidated Damages and Penalty Damages
Liquidated damages clauses "determine in advance what damages
will be assessed in the event of a breach" with certain limitations. 258
The two criteria considered in determining whether a liquidated dam-
ages clause in an employment contract is enforceable are (1) how well
the parties are informed, and (2) whether the agreements were reached
through arms-length negotiations. 259 For example, in the context of
breaching a noncompete clause, it is permissible to agree to an
amount of liquidated damages when the amount is reasonable, 20
when the amount is not a penalty, 261 and when actual damages are by
their nature uncertain. 262 The reasonableness of the amount tends to
be the determinative factor in enforcing such clauses.263
It is well settled in Florida that parties to a contract may stipulate
an amount to be paid as liquidated damages in the event of a
breach. 264 However, a liquidated damages clause will be invalid if it is
found to be a "penalty" for breach of contract. 25 In Hyman v.
Cohen 216 the Florida Supreme Court established a two-prong analysis
to determine whether a liquidated damages clause is a penalty: (1)
whether the damages were readily ascertainable by the parties at the
time the contract was entered into and (2) whether the liquidated dam-
256. Id.
257. See Juvenile Diabetes Res. Found., 370 So. 2d at 36 (noting that the burden of proof is
measured by "the greater weight of the evidence").
258. JorN D. CAA1M&.I & JOSEPH M. PEILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 640 (3d ed. 1987).
259. Criss v. Davis, Presser & LaFaye, P.A., 494 So. 2d 525, 526 (Fla. 1st DCA) (upholding
as reasonable the liquidated value of accounting clients when successfully solicited by a former
employee, and that such liquidated value could be derived from the price of an established ac-
counting business), rev. denied, 501 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. 1986).
260. Id.
261. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland v. LaSalle, 413 So. 2d 436, 437 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (striking
liquidated damages clause upon finding that the given liquidated value of clients in a fact sce-
nario similar to that in Criss "was predicated upon inadequate consideration and imposed an
oppressive penalty"), cited with approval in Criss, 494 So. 2d at 526.
262. Criss, 494 So. 2d at 526 (citing Secrist v. National Serv. Indus., 395 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1981)).
263. CAL, AIa & PEaMLO, supra note 258, at 640. For a more thorough discussion of liqui-
dated damages clauses and their limitations, see id. at 639-46.
264. See Lefemine v. Baron, 573 So. 2d 326, 328 (Fla. 1991).
265. See Poinsettia Dairy Prod., Inc. v. Wessel Co., 166 So. 306, 309 (Fla. 1936); Lefemine,
573 So. 2d at 328.
266. 73 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 1954) (although this case dealt with a liquidated damages clause in a
lease, the analysis is equally applicable to employment contracts).
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ages are "grossly disproportionate" to the actual damages resulting
from the breach.26 7 An affirmative answer to these questions will gen-
erally lead a court to find that the liquidated damages clause is a
"penalty," and thus invalid.
D. Limitations of Damages
At the core of the at-will employment philosophy the value of a job
is no more than the value of an underlying opportunity to work for
money. 2 8 Florida places nominal value on such opportunities when
not accompanied by completed performance,2 69 and thus does not
consider at-will employment as a property interest. 270 Accordingly, an
employee's measure of damages for an employer's breach is not the
value of the previous employment which the employee gave up to ac-
cept his current position, but rather the damages the employee suf-
fered as a result of the breach of the current employment contract. 27'
Similarly, damages for an employer's breach of a lifetime employment
contract cannot be calculated by assuming the employment would
have continued for the life of the corporation.27 2 "Such damages
would be so speculative as to render them impossible of determina-
tion. "273 Finally, damages for breach of an employment contract are
limited to those which foreseeably flow from the breach and do not
include damages for tort-based injuries such as severe embarrassment
or humiliation. 274
The aforementioned rules act as limitations on damages which may
be recovered upon a breach of contract. A court may also determine
that employees may waive their rights to recover damages. For exam-
ple, employees may waive their rights to damages for an employer's
breach "by failing to timely demand performance of the obligations
appurtenant to that right.' '275
267. Id. at 401.
268. See discussion supra part III; I CoRaiN, supra note 3, § 70 (1963) (the employment
relationship as a unilateral contract); Protecting At Will Employees, supra note 3, at 1818-19.
269. See Knudsen v. Green, 156 So. 240, 243 (Fla. 1934). In Florida, "upon a breach of such
contract the servant's measure of damages is the worth of the bargain upon which the action is
based." Id.
270. See Kelly v. Gill, 544 So. 2d 1162, 1164 (Fla. 5th DCA), rev. denied, 553 So. 2d 1165
(Fla. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1029 (1990).
271. Id.; see also discussion supra part VIII.
272. Hope v. National Airlines, 99 So. 2d 244, 246 (Fla. 3d DCA 1957).
273. Id.
274. Henry Morrison Flagler Museum v. Lee, 268 So. 2d 434, 435 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972).
275. Arbogast v. Bryan, 393 So. 2d 606, 608 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) (employee/real estate
salesman waived rights to commissions by failing to object to commission reductions during six
year employment period) (citing Davis v. Davis, 123 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960)).
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IX. CONCLUSION
Legal practitioners should consider the effects of an employment
contract on the client, who will probably be an employer, by compar-
ing the for-cause duties the contract imparts on the employer with
those few duties imparted in a common law at-will employment rela-
tionship. Such consideration may necessitate giving the client advice
contrary to the client's desire to form such a contract, but it may
avoid having the client bound to additional common law duties the
client neither considered nor desired.
The Florida Legislature, short of making Florida into a wrongful
discharge state, 276 may see fit to legislate causes of action for retalia-
tory discharge for refusing to perform illegal acts at the behest of em-
ployers, for filing sexual harassment charges against the employer, for
"whistle-blowing," and for exercising a vested or statutory right. 277
Additionally, employers who make express promises to their em-
ployees, such as in employment manuals, should be held to them re-
gardless of the promises' unilateral characteristics or lack of
consideration, 271 provided, of course, that employees change position
in reliance on such promises. Currently, an employee's detrimental re-
liance is not consideration for a cause of action for breach of con-
tract, absent a showing that the manual has been integrated into the
contract. As employers have control over their promises, employees
should not be denied a cause of action simply because they relied on
promises made within employment manuals or "literature" without
supplying additional consideration in addition to performance. 219
"[Employment contract] language should not be a mare's nest for
prospective employees . . . . [because] not all prospective employees
are law students." 280
Florida employees should not be discouraged from whistle-blowing,
exercising their rights at law, or accessing the courts. Additionally,
employers should not easily evade their promises just because employ-
ees failed to master the intricacies of complying with lawyers' terms of
art-i.e. knowing when to "supply additional consideration" or the
importance of "mutuality of obligation." 28 1 This would make Justice
276. See generally C. Ray Gullett & George D. Greenwade, Employment at Will: The No
Fault Alternative, 39 LAB. L.J. 372 (1988).
277. See, e.g., Gumbel & Hoover, supra note 101.
278. Cf. Nunes v. Margate Gen. Hosp., Inc., 435 So. 2d 916, 918 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)
(reversing the trial court's summary judgment that the term "permanent employees" as applied
to appellant in no way meant a permanent employee).
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. See generally id.; Brodie, supra note 5.
19931
204 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:167
Overton content, deliver Florida from the finger-in-the-dike rationale
of limiting employee rights, and place no undeserved burden on the
employer.
